The missed [soccer] match

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themadgreek
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Re: The missed [soccer] match

Postby themadgreek » Fri Dec 09, 2016 9:55 am

jwocky wrote:but some details indicate, he had enough fuel to make it on the runway and to the apron).


from http://avherald.com/h?article=4a16583c&opt=0 (which I consider a reliable source)

Fuel Computations

A dispatcher at a large airline together with input from The Aviation Herald computed various flight plan possibilities with respect to distances and fuel needed according to Bolivia's law. During the accident flight the enroute winds averaged at a headwind component of 4 knots.

In summary it can be said, that flights from Santa Cruz (VVI) to Medellin (MDE) or Bogota (BOG) could not have been planned legally, even if the aircraft was equipped with pannier tanks. Even in optimistic computations the computed trip fuel alone, without any taxi, contingency, diversion or reserve fuel, would have exceeded the standard fuel tank capacity (9362kg).

The dispatcher computed three different flight plans, see in detail at the PDF http://avherald.com/files/lamia_flightplans.pdf:

Santa Cruz-Medellin Alternate Bogota with no payload: Trip Fuel 8,660kg, Release Fuel 11,838kg
Santa Cruz-Medellin Alternate Bogota optimistic weights: Trip Fuel 9,380kg, Release Fuel 12,461kg
Santa Cruz-Bogota Alternate Medellin optimistic weights: Trip Fuel 9,260kg, Release Fuel 12,578kg


---

That being said, I do agree it's too early to just point the finger and blame the pilot.

I find it odd that they held for so long, despite being so low on fuel (if we assume they ran out of fuel -- still a big assumption, since the evidence would on the crash site would be similar if they were low on fuel). Why would they not divert to the bigger airport in Medellin which isn't that far away? So the question becomes, were the really completely unaware of the lack of fuel, or was there an instrument failure that lead them to believe they had more fuel than they really had? I think (and hope) the CVR will shed some light on this.

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Re: The missed [soccer] match

Postby jwocky » Fri Dec 09, 2016 12:17 pm

Well, since the plane obviously made it till almost Medellin, the calculations of this dispatcher have to have an error, right. I mean, if the obviously result was according to his calculations impossible, it had to be a problem with the calculations, simpy because you can't cheat real life physics.

Soooo, we know, an RJ85 is cerified for a range of 1570 nm with FAA reserves and MTOW. Only, this plane had full tanks (standard, without panier) but less than MTOW (68 passengers, not 100, the full capacity). So, 4knots headwind? Errr, on what base did he calculate that? The first part of the flight at FL280, the second part at FL300 or the last few miles on FL210? I would assume, he had a lot more at FL280, the weather looked a bit dense, Which is why they climbed then to FL300.
According to the range, not even calculating in that the plane was not fully loaded, he would have, under normal conditions, started to use the reserve just 30 miles before Medellin. Given the 30 minutes reserve, he could have made it even with two, even with three circles.
There is so much, that makes me wonder about this out of fuel theory. The turbine, I wrote enough about that. The first impact site, where we see parts of the tail. Then the cut path up the slope. Quite steep there. And trees, lots of trees. Still no debris along the path. So, where did the additional thrust come from that lifted that aircraft high enough up after already a part of the tail was missing, to kick basically over most of those trees. If that plane would have slid on the belly up that slope, the wings would have ended up on the trees. They are almost completely at the main debris site. How the hell would have had this plane even enough force to make it up there and then basically already over the ridge? How if there was no engine thrust because she was out of fuel?
However, electrical failure means no radar, no TCAS. Listen to the ATC tape, the part where the ATC asks for the altitude because she couldn't see it on the radar anymore. Secondary radar works only if there is a direct line of sight and the transponder has power. The transponder should have had power even if the engines were out because of the batteries. We knew, if the plane was on battery, those batteries were good. Listen how clear the pilot comes through in the radio. Very very strong for a system on emergency batteries. Basically suspiciously strong, almost as if the power was full there, the generators and the APU working. So, electrical failure but some parts have power. Doesn't that make anyone wonder? This radio was on full power when the pilot reported total electrical failure. The transponder is no mystery. The transponder worked probably just fine, but the plane was already covered by Cerro Gordo, the ridge it hit then. The pilot was surprised when he looked and said 9000ft. He wasn't aware, he was thousand feet lower than planned already. And then, the tail and at first only the tail hit the ground. How is that possible? This is a slope. Thus, it is only possible if the tail is a lot lower than the nose. Means, pitch angle. A lot of pitch. Where do you get so much pitch? Only if you pull the yoke full backwards. Next thing, your nose goes up and that moment stays with you for seconds, even after your tail goes. That's the next hint, physics gives us. A hit with the tail should have given at least some impulse to tilt forward again. But the nose remained high. Because if the nose wouldn't have remained high, the wings wouldn't have made it over the trees. So we know the nose was up. But of course, also simple physics, she couldn't get more speed, she was almost or completely in a stall, meters above the slope. She basically climbed just as much as the mountain slope. So what cut that path in the trees must have been the rear end of the plane. The part missing at the main debris site. So, where did all that thrust come from if the engines had no power because no fuel? Where?
The problem is, we have already reached the point where everybody has spoken his judgment, where governments take influence to make witnesses lie, where influential people try to whitewash themselves. So, I expect, someone will write, not enough fuel and that's it. Not because it is true or anybody bothered to look at this electrical failure and found evidence against it, but because the minds are already tained, there is not even a clean investigation possible anymore under these conditions. So, no fuel speaks the manufacturer free from guilt, speaks all maintenance companies free of guilt. Bolivia solves their problems by blaming the clerk who took the flightplan and the pilot can't contradict anymore, he is dead, conveniently as it looks.
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Re: The missed [soccer] match

Postby IAHM-COL » Sat Dec 10, 2016 12:21 am

@KL666

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Re: The missed [soccer] match

Postby KL-666 » Tue Dec 27, 2016 5:26 pm

The Colombian Aviation Authority presented some facts yesterday.

On Dec 26th 2016 Colombia's Aerocivil introduced their preliminary report in a press conference (the preliminary report itself was not released) stating, that the aircraft did not show any technical fault, there was no sabotage or suicide attempt. The evidence revealed the aircraft suffered fuel exhaustion. The crew was aware of their fuel status and considered fuel stops in Leticia (Colombia) and Bogota (Colombia), however did not decide to perform such stops. The aircraft was operated at a takeoff weight of 42,148 kg, maximum takeoff weight permitted 41,800 kg, this takeoff weight was not a factor into the accident however. According to cockpit voice recordings the first officer and observer repeatedly calculated the fuel and considered a fuel stop in Leticia but did not follow up as they did not know whether the airport was open. The aircraft features a system that activates an alarm if the fuel remaining was no longer sufficient for more than 20 minutes of flight, however, this system did not activate. 10 minutes prior to impact the crew requested priority for landing and selected the first stage of flaps. The aircraft began to turn and descend without ATC clearance causing separation problems with the other aircraft in the hold. 6 minutes prior to impact engine #3 is the first to flame out, 5 minutes prior to impact the crew selected the next stage of flaps and selected the landing gear down, the crew advised ATC ground services were not needed. Engine #2 fails. 3:45 minutes prior to impact all engines had flamed out, the aircraft was without power, the APU also failed due to lack of fuel. 2 minutes prior to impact the crew declared emergency reporting total power failure. The aircraft impacted Cerro Gordo at a speed of 230km/h (124 knots) below 9000 feet when they needed to be above 10,000 feet to safely cross the mountain.

http://avherald.com/h?article=4a16583c&opt=0


Interesting parts:

1) CVR indicated that the flight crew was constantly making fuel calculations and considering alternatives, so they were very aware of the risk they were taking. They gambled wrong.

2) The 20 minutes fuel left alarm did not activate. Given their complete lack of responsible behaviour, it is most likely they pulled the circuit breaker as a standard take off procedure.

3) The engines went down one by one in a period of 2:15 minutes. The first one went down when they were still at or near fl 210, around the moment they bluntly tell ATC they had already started descent. After the last engine went down they waited 1:45 minutes until they say: "no engine power, no electricity".

What has changed in that 1:45 minutes flying with no engines, to change their mind and report their status? No engine power did not scare them enough to say anything for 1:45 minutes. So i suppose that when they did report their status, their battery had given up on them too. Now flying blind they really panicked, and felt forced to report "no engine power, no electricity".

What were they thinking? That the ATC would pick up her magic wand and save them all? I have never heard of such an irresponsible airline operation. Such risks are not even taken by boys with their mopeds or their first car. I will be very surprised if this investigation does not lead to a conviction of murder in cold blood.

Kind regards, Vincent

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Re: The missed [soccer] match

Postby jwocky » Tue Dec 27, 2016 6:13 pm

Okay ... all systems were okay ... but the alarm didn't go off, so we know, one system was definitively NOT okay, for what reasons ever.
Then, 6 minutes prior to impact, engine 3 flames out ... well, that is obviously based on black box data. Still 5 minutes prior to impact, they go on flaps 2 and gear out ... hummm ... so they did that early because they had too much speed despite one engine out?
Then engine #2 flames out, no time, but it has to be more than a minute after engine #3 ... so, lets just assume, for some unknown reason, this engine had 1 minute longer fuel. Can be, it's the inner one on the other side and if the x-fer was not open ... who knows? At 1:15 minutes after #3 flamed out, all four engines flamed out and the APU had stopped because lack of fuel.
Okay ... here is the rub ... if the cross-feed valve is NOT open, the APU gets fuel from the left wing feeder tank. Which means, if you are our of fuel and don't have the cross-feed open, not #3 but #2 is the first to go.
The other still unexplained problem is, why were the batteries so empty (if they were empty). I mean, it's nice to claim ... okay at 1:45 minutes later, the batteries were empty and they panicked.

So, basically, this report is what I expected earlier ... they blame the pilot no matter what (and not entirely unjustified, they should have made a fuel stop, no question about that), but basically it's just covering their asses and therefore this slightly contradictory report.

Okay, who here would, with one engine out, go earlier than he has to on more flaps and put the gear out?
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Re: The missed [soccer] match

Postby KL-666 » Wed Dec 28, 2016 12:16 am

jwocky wrote:they blame the pilot no matter what


I do not think that is the is the case. This is an interim report on *this* flight. The final report will surely contain contributing factors, like that they have done such too long flights before. Incriminating at least the airline, and maybe further. The Bolivians have already arrested the co-owner of the pilot/owner. Also the head of the government office issuing airline licenses has been arrested. Incidentally that is the son of the co-owner. Also high ranking officers of the bureau that takes in flight plans have been arrested. So all this is gong quite wide already. Maybe not all the way to top government officials, but far wider than just "blame the pilot".

jwocky wrote:Okay, who here would, with one engine out, go earlier than he has to on more flaps and put the gear out?


In the first place i would not have a flight plan further than: destination fuel + alternate fuel + 30 minutes fuel + contingency fuel (e.g. for unexpected head wind). Failing that, i would have called a mayday immediately at contacting Medellin ATC and fly straight in. Failing that, and my first engine goes off, i would start descent towards landing immediately (like they did). But knowing i likely have to glide (one engine died already), i would not dive to the prescribed 10.000 ft at the VOR for aircraft with engine power. No, i'd keep the configuration clean and arrive at the VOR above 12.000 ft, or rather even 14.000 ft, and start a steep imaginary glide slope from there. It will naturally be steeper than standard when you glide. And i'd rather have a bit too much height to bleed off gliding on glide slope, than too little.

Edit:
A normal pilot studies the approach chart in advance and learns it by heart. He knows without looking at the chart that he has to be at 10.000 ft at the VOR. So when signs of fuel starvation start he'll think: ok, i have to be well above that at the VOR. Not 1000 ft below! These guys had no awareness whatsoever, so i'm pretty sure they did not even have a glance at the approach chart before reaching Medellin. Maybe they did not even have the charts with them, trusting the ATC would guide them in. Again: not blaming the pilot, but the sick/criminal culture at that airline.

Kind regards, Vincent


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